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DEEPER LONGINGS: THE RELEVANCE OF
CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY FOR CONTEMPORARY
RIGHTS THEORIES
Kevin P. Leet
INTRODUCTION
This essay argues for the relevancy of political theology' for
contemporary natural rights theories. The belief that human beings
have rights that cannot be denied or abrogated has evolved in the
West for at least the past six hundred years. Standard accounts2 hold
that natural rights theories have their origins in medieval natural law
ethics, which sought to understand the nature of human dignity in
terms of the final cause (telos) that was held to be the Divine person of
the Holy Trinity. But by the end of the seventeenth century, the idea
of final causes had lost philosophical respectability.' It was no longer
possible to hold that political communities were ordained by God's
Providence to serve the ends of eternal peace and justice. A new
tradition of political theory developed that sought to explain society
entirely by reference to efficient causes.4 It created the idea of a social
compact wherein each individual was supposed to have surrendered
self-sovereignty to the state in return for guarantees that certain
-f Assistant Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
1. By "political theology" I mean, broadly, thinking critically about social arrangements
from the perspective of various modes of thinking about the nature of the divine.
2. See, e.g., BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES ON NATURAL RIGHTS,
NATURAL LAW AND CHURCH LAW, 1150-1625 (1997); 1 QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF
MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1978).
3. See, e.g., ANTHONY KENNY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 202-29 (1998)
(arguing that Aristotelian metaphysics was replaced by other theories in the thought of notables
like Thomas Hobbes and John Locke in England, and Spinoza and Leibniz on the Continent).
4. An exemplar here is Hobbes's Leviathan, in which he describes a materialist view of
the human being. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett
Publ'g Co. 1994) (1651).
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natural rights would be protected.' Questions about the ultimate
purpose and meaning of human existence (and the moral
consequences of the answers to these questions) were extricated from
public life, since to bring them into public discourse seemed too
evocative of theocratic temptations. Accordingly, religious beliefs
were set to the margins of public life, if not driven from the field.
Nonetheless, as William T. Cavanaugh and Peter Scott observe,6
those who argued in the wake of the collapse of the Berlin Wall that
Western liberalism had no viable challengers (as Francis Fukuyama
famously did in the early 1990s)7 "are still sorting through the rude
awakening from this fantasy"' that dawned on that clear blue
morning of September 11, 2001, with the collapse of the walls of the
World Trade Center. Religious belief, it turns out, will not long
remain relegated to the sidelines of history. It remains a force in
society for good and ill. Religion cannot be privatized because
political life is eminently concerned with the meaning and purpose of
human life in community.
For several decades now, political thinkers have affirmed this by
wondering publicly whether natural rights theories must reference a
comprehensive account of the human person (for example, in
accounts that locate the human person as a moral being in relation to
a traditional conception of God,9 in relation to Being itself,' ° or in a
complex social ontology"). At root here is the belief that
contemporary natural rights theories are disconnected from the
sources of meaning that structure a decent political society. The
modern attempt to root politics in the sovereignty of the self has led
to political theories that embrace boundless autonomy, banal versions
of tolerance, and the "possessive individualism" (to use C. B.
5. Famous exemplars of the social contract theory are Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. See Michele Goodwin, Rethinking Legislative Consent Law 5 DEPAUL
J. HEALTH CARE L. 257, 301 (2002).
6. William T. Cavanaugh & Peter Scott, Introducton to THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO
POLITICAL THEOLOGY 1-2 (Peter Scott & William T. Cavanaugh eds., 2004).
7. See generaily FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).
8. Cavanaugh & Scott, supra note 6, at 1.
9. See generally Charles E. Rice, Rights and the Need for Objective Moral Liaits, 3 AVE
MARIA L. REV. 259 (2005).
10. See generally Kenneth L. Schmitz, The Ontology of Rights, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 275
(2005).
11. See generally Kenneth L. Grasso, The Rights of Monads or of Intrinsically Social
Beings? Social Ontology and Rights Talk, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 233 (2005).
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Macpherson's phrase)12 of the sovereign self seeking to be the
principle of its own being. A number of proposals have been made
that seek reform through reconnecting political theory to a deeper
search for meaning (and the attendant moral consequences). 3
According to this view, at least a part of the problem with
contemporary rights theories lies in separating rights from the
probing questions about the meaning and purpose of human life that
have always carried with them a tantalizing scent of mystery.
It is here that theology has something to offer political theory.
Rather than privatizing questions about the ends and purposes of
society, political theology seeks to understand the proper structures
for society as disclosed to lives lived in obedience to Scripture and the
rightful authority of tradition. 4 It boldly reasserts the Aristotelian
conception of the nature of politics as the genus to which moral
reasoning is the species, where political action is constrained by
societal reflection and judgment about the meaning and purpose of
human life and human communities.'5 A space is opened by political
theology in which political actions do not trundle along blindly but
are rooted in critical self-reflection and repentant judgments. By
reasserting the rightful place of moral reflection in political
deliberation, political theology holds the potential to reunite natural
rights theories with inquiry into the deepest longings of the human
heart.
I. POLITICAL DISCOURSE AS THE SEARCH FOR MEANING
Oliver O'Donovan has argued that with the loss of teleological
perspectives on the nature of human goodness and being, political
thought came to be dominated by the rationality of efficient causality,
which can be examined through the scientific method. 6 This has had
12. C. B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO
LOCKE (1962).
13. Broadly construed, the idea of re-invigorating Aristotelian modes of political theory is a
project shared by thinkers as diverse as John Stewart Mill, Karl Marx, Amartya Sen, Martha
Nussbaum, John Finnis, and Alasdair Macintyre. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS
OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 42 & n.66, 78, 83 (1999); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A
STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed. 1984).
14. See, e.g., OLIVER O'DONOVAN, THE DESIRE OF THE NATIONS: REDISCOVERING THE ROOTS
OF POLITICAL THEOLOGY 12-13 (1996) (discussing political philosophy and political ethics within
the context of Christian history).
15. For a description of political theology, see id. at 6-29.
16. See id. at 8.
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devastating effects on the conceptualization of human rights. The
sorts of reasoning involved in science and technology proved so
successful in extending human knowledge and power that other
forms of rationality (especially classical philosophy's search for the
meaning) were ignored or even driven from the field. 7 Today at most
major universities politics is viewed as the product of social processes
which properly are studied through the social sciences."
Social sciences use the modern scientific method to study the
processes of society in order to provide the unity that classical
political theory, in its innocence, found in the harmony of the divine,
the natural, and the political orders. By examining human persons
empirically, the social sciences hope to unite nature and society,
having long relegated God to the margins of the private sphere. In
the end, however, the social sciences ultimately fail because they
cannot supply the moral ends or purposes of politics by looking solely
to the exterior behavior of persons while remaining blind to the hearts
of men and women struggling to live meaningful lives in community.
A number of years ago, Robert Bellah made this point when he
contrasted the humanities, which "have to do with the transmission
and interpretation of cultural traditions in the realms of philosophy,
religion, literature, language, and the arts," with the social sciences,
which "involve [solely] the scientific study of human action,"'9
something known only through its external appearance in the world.
Therefore, "[t]he assumption is that the social sciences are not cultural
traditions but rather occupy a privileged position of pure
observation."20 The social sciences do not concern themselves with the
mysteries of life and its many values, but can only examine what are
taken to be objective facts.
Hannah Arendt refers to this tendency in modern thought as
"functionalism," which she views as an attempt to think about mere
appearances alone, without questioning the depths of reality that
might lie behind, below, above, or beyond the visible surface.2'
17. See, e.g., Karl-Otto Apel, Types of Rationality Today: The Continuum of Reason
Between Science and Ethics, in HANS GEORG GADAMER & THEODORE F. GERAETS, LA
RATIONALITt AuJOuRD'HuI [RATIONALITY TO-DAY] 307 (1979).
18. For a discussion of the difference between political science and political theory, see
JAMES V. SCHALL, ROMAN CATHOLIC POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1-10 (2004).
19. ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN
AMERICAN LIFE 301 (1985).
20. Id.
21. HANNAH ARENDT, THE LIFE OF THE MIND 27 (1978).
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Arendt believes that this mode of thinking has some appeal today
over more ancient philosophies that struggled to find meaning in the
metaphysical truth of things:
The great advantage of functionalism is that it presents us again with
a unitary world view, and the old metaphysical dichotomy of (true)
Being and (mere) Appearance, together with the old prejudice of
Being's supremacy over appearance, is still kept intact, albeit in a
different manner. The argument has shifted; appearances are no
longer depreciated as "secondary qualities" but understood as
necessary conditions for essential processes that go on inside the
living organism.22
As Arendt observes, "Since we live in an appearing world, is it not
much more plausible that the relevant and the meaningful in this
world of ours should be located precisely on the surface?" 23 The hope
of living on the surface, of skimming like a water bug over the glassy
smoothness of appearance without slipping into the depths of
mystery, gives respite to the mind's restless grasp for the meaning
that lies above, below, behind, and beyond. This is indeed tempting
precisely because it provides a certain soothing balm for the mind in
turmoil by what Leszek Kolakowski unforgettably referred to as
"metaphysical horror." 24
History, too, when read apart from the human search for meaning
and self-understanding and divorced from theology and literature,
falls into the sort of functionalism to which Arendt refers. Reading
the history of rights discourse and of the use of words like jus
naturale, without developing a sensitivity for and deeper under-
standing of the idea of human rights, deadens the discourse, since
human rights are given full meaning only when viewed as a response
to the human search for meaning and for acceptance in community
and in the cosmos. 25 Shorn from any depth of meaning and purpose,
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. LESZEK KoLAKOwsKI, METAPHYSICAL HORROR (Agnieszka Kolakowska ed., Univ. of
Chicago Press rev. ed. 2001) (1988).
25. Brian Tierney, for example, takes a functionalist stance in his approach to the historical
origins of the idea of natural rights. His basic orientation toward efficient causality is evident in
his description of the agenda of his exploration of the origins of human rights in this series of
questions: "When did the idea of natural rights find 'explicit recognition and elucidation'? What
historical context made such a development possible? How did the idea come to survive once it
had grown into existence?" TIERNEY, supra note 2, at 3. His concern as a historian is with root
causes, not ultimate purposes. And his failure to grasp the significance of the shift from
Spring 2005]
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rights themselves are set adrift of purpose and meaning. The endless
seeking of rights becomes banal without some under-standing of
what rights are for. By focusing on the function of rights in historical
social processes, political science loses contact with questions about
what direction a society ought to take. Social processes, including
rights claims, bluster ahead blindly. Lost is the ability of political
theory to encompass the direction a society ought to take and the
place of rights claims in pursuing that course.
To determine the norms for directing society, political theory must
move beyond the reverie of mere appearance. Deep questions must
be addressed about the purpose and meaning of human rights, the
source and significance of human dignity, and the importance of
rights for the morally good life. This is not an epistemological claim,
but an anthropological one. It is the claim that human beings are the
kind of creatures who have a thirst for meaning and understanding.
This great insight was expressed by Aristotle in the opening lines of
his Metaphysics: "All men by nature desire to know. An indication of
this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their
usefulness they are loved for themselves.... "26 Desire and delight
are powerful human responses to the richness and splendor of the
world, and the human desire to apprehend the great and mysterious
meanings of human existence has been the inspiration of
contemplative philosophy throughout history. One cannot, therefore,
exhaust the desire to know mystery by remaining on the surface. As
Arendt puts it,
It is more than likely that men, if they were ever to lose the appetite
for meaning we call thinking and cease to ask unanswerable
questions, would lose not only the ability to produce those thought-
things that we call works of art but also the capacity to ask all the
answerable questions upon which every civilization is founded.27
teleologically metaphysical accounts of Being to efficient causality is evident in his naive
statement, "There is no reason why such a [teleological] metaphysics should be incongruous
with an emphasis on individual rights." Id. at 31. The atomistic metaphysical presuppositions
tend to thwart understanding of the deeper search for human meaning upon which rights
theories rested.
26. ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, m 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE. 1552, 1552
(Jonathan Barnes ed., W. D. Ross trans., 1984).
27. ARENDT, supra note 21, at 62.
294 [Vol. 3:1
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What is needed now, Arendt contends, is a way of thinking that
recognizes both the value of the surface and the value of looking
behind or beneath it.
This attempt to live on the surface like a water bug-skimming
along without diving-has led, as Pope John Paul II has lamented, to
the "increasing fragmentation of knowledge, "2' especially the attempt
to cordon off social sciences from the humanities and, in particular,
philosophy. He cautions that a "philosophy which no longer asks the
question of the meaning of life would be in grave danger of reducing
reason to merely accessory functions, with no real passion for the
search for truth,"29 and he argues that "at the present time in
particular, the search for ultimate truth seems often to be neglected."3"
The philosopher today "is expected to rest content with more modest
tasks such as the simple interpretation of facts or an enquiry into
restricted fields of human knowing or its structures."3 This has been
a disaster for philosophy and the overall culture. The pope explains
the effects of this narrowing of philosophy in the following passage:
Sundered from that truth, individuals are at the mercy of caprice,
and their state as persons ends up being judged by pragmatic criteria
based essentially upon experimental data, in the mistaken belief that
technology must dominate all. It has happened therefore that
reason, rather than voicing the human orientation toward truth, has
wilted under the weight of so much knowledge and little by little has
lost the capacity to lift its gaze to the heights, not daring to rise to the
truth of being. Abandoning the investigation of being, modern
philosophical research has concentrated instead upon human
knowing. Rather than make use of the human capacity to know the
truth, modem philosophy has preferred to accentuate the ways in
which this capacity is limited and conditioned.32
In this rich passage, the pope suggests that modern philosophy's twin
focus on epistemology and the dichotomy between facts and moral
values caused human reason to become "wilted" and philosophical
reflection to have "lost... its gaze to the heights." It has forced its
focus to be confined narrowly to questions of mostly scientific and
28. Pope John Paul II, Fides et Ratio [Encyclical Letter on the Relationship Between Faith
and Reason] It 81 (St. Paul ed. 1998) [hereinafter Fides etRato].
29. Id.
30. Id. 5.
31. Id. 155.
32. Id. T 5.
Spring 2005]
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technical reasoning, which view instrumental satisfaction as the
highest expression of rationality. Against this crisis of modem
philosophy, the pope calls on Catholic philosophers to ask "radical
questions" 33 and to shun the "false modesty"' of views that claim to
be humble in their neutrality, while in fact asserting false
comprehensive claims about human nature and the nature of reality.
If the pope is right about this, then it should not be surprising that
it is common to describe the current state of affairs as a period of
fragmentation." Although fragments of Christian moral culture are
still present-although certain words and rituals are still followed
and some people even seek to build cocoon-like communities against
the modern world-most political actors today do not understand
themselves as partaking of the Christian narrative. They may, from
time-to-time, deploy a stray Christian word or concept, but the
coherence of the vision is lost, and with it, much of the true meaning
of Christian words and symbols. In the words of Alasdair Maclntyre,
What we possess, if this view is true, are the fragments of a
conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from which
their significance derived. We possess indeed simulacra of morality,
we continue to use many of the key expressions. But we have-very
largely, if not entirely-lost our comprehension, both theoretical and
practical, or morality.3 6
All that is left are fragments, and these fragments we cobble together
to give justifications for our actions. But the sort of comprehensive
moral anthropology that once underwrote moral and political theory
appears to be no longer possible for the vast majority of persons who
are formed more by materialism and consumerism than by the
Church.
II. CHRISTIANITY AND THE TRINITARIAN SEARCH FOR MEANING
To confront this fragmentation and loss of meaning, Christianity
(and therefore the recovery of Christian concepts) offers a fully
33. Id.
34. Id.; see also id. 1 56.
35. See, e.g., DAVID TRACY, THE ANALOGICAL IMAGINATION: CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY AND THE
CULTURE OF PLURALISM 3-27 (1981) (describing the fragmented nature of the "three principal
'publics' for a contemporary theologian: the wider society, the academy and the church").
36. MACINTYRE, supra note 13, at 2.
[Vol. 3:1
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integrated Trinitarian view of the person. In order to gain purchase
on this assertion, it is helpful to consider the nature of Christian
doctrine, and to do this it is useful to consider a conceptualization of
religion known as the "cultural-linguistic" theory, developed a
number of years ago by the Yale University theologian George
Lindbeck.37 According to Lindbeck, "religions are... comprehensive
interpretive schemes, usually embodied in myths or narratives and
heavily ritualized, which structure human experience and
understanding of self and world."38 In this view, individual religious
doctrines are viewed as parts of whole interpretive schemes that lose
their meaning once disassociated from the context of their religious
culture. The Eucharist, for example, viewed by an Enlightenment
philosopher will undoubtedly hold different meaning, significance,
and possibilities than it would for a contemporary Catholic layperson.
An eleventh century Japanese Zen Buddhist would likely look upon a
cup of tea with a different eye-different meanings and possibilities-
than anyone would today.39
The theologian Bruce Marshall observed in his recent book Trinity
and Truth that belief in the Trinity is essential to Christian thought."
This belief gives a comprehensive structure to the Christian narrative
and thereby provides a central feature to the interpretive scheme by
which Christians find meaning and interpret the world. Father
Augustine DiNoia has written of Marshall's work in the following
passage:
I also borrow from [Marshall] the expression, "epistemic primacy."
In effect, this doctrine says that you always must start with the
Trinity. Or to put it another way, also borrowing a wonderful
phrase from another Lutheran theologian, "the Trinity is not a
puzzle, but is itself the solution to all of the other puzzles." The
reason I think we have to say this is that it is what Christ taught us,
and therefore, what the apostles commended to the Church to
continue to preach and what Christ himself bears witness to in our
midst. It is the awesome truth that, God, who is in need of no one,
37. GEORGE A. LINDBECK, THE NATURE OF DOCTRINE: RELIGION AND THEOLOGY IN A
POSTLIBERAL AGE 32 (1984).
38. Id.
39. For an interesting engagement of the Advaita/Sankara tradition in India from a
perspective informed by Lindbeck's work, see FRANCIS X. CLOONEY, S.J., THEOLOGY AFTER
VEDANTA: AN EXPERIMENT IN COMPARATIVE THEOLOGY (1993).
40. BRUCE D. MARSHALL, TRINITY AND TRUTH 3-5 (2000).
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desires to share the community of Trinitarian life, with what is not
God.4'
According to Marshall, it is the doctrine of the Trinity, understood
from within the believing community, that provides not only the
interpretative stance, but also the standards of rationality by which a
Christian can justify his belief.'2 A Christian epistemology, according
to Marshall, must be fully Trinitarian.43
There are, of course, implications for political theory as well. The
Trinitarian narrative has God the Father at its apex, as both the source
and sustainer of Being and as the sovereign upon whose judgment a
well-ordered society is founded. Political theology is explained by
Oliver O'Donovan in this way:
[T]he root of any true political order, in which human beings can
relate to God and to each other lovingly, is the conspicuous
judgment of God. The good order of society is founded upon a
judgment (dikai6rma), a declarative act which establishes a justice
(dikaiosun). Without God's judgments we cannot comprehend
how we may live together. In judgment the paradoxical conflict
between the freedom of the Word of God and the necessity of
immanent justice in history is resolved. God's Word becomes
judgment, in that its freedom creates the order of a concrete society;
and the necessity of history becomes judgment, too, in that its
tragedy is turned into the freedom of the saints' corporate
obedience. 4
4
Traditionally, Christian political theory encompasses all order and all
judgment. It "identif[ies] the political with the sphere of judgment,
divine and human, that gives order to the human community in
history. ' 4' But the political arena is also viewed as a morally
ambiguous sphere, one in which order is given and sustained by God
through law, while also being the sphere in which humans rebel
against God-as evidenced by the crucifixion of Christ and the
41. Augustine DiNoia, Lvine Wisdom and Christian Humanism (Feb. 23, 2000), LECTURES
& SEMINARS: A SERIES OF TALKS BY THE FAITH & REASON INSTITUTE, athttp://www.frinstitute.
org/dinoia.htm (on file with the Ave Maria Law Review).
42. See MARSHALL, supra note 40, at 72-107.
43. Id. at 259.
44. OLIVER O'DONOVAN & JOAN LOCKWOOD O'DONOVAN, BONDS OF IMPERFECTION:
CHRISTIAN POLmCS, PAST AND PRESENT 43 (2004).
45. Id. at 2.
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persecution of Christian martyrs.4 6 Political power brings no lasting
peace, but it opens a space where a Christian life is possible. Thus, as
St. Augustine taught, the measure of justice that is obtained on earth
is tragically inadequate.47 Only the coming of the Kingdom of God
brings the true and lasting peace of Christ. Until then, it is not law
and political force that are forward-looking toward the triumph of
Christ, but the coming together of Christians in communities-
communities that are fragile gifts of God-that long for the eschaton.
III. THE THOMISTIC EXEMPLAR
If a recovery of a Christian basis for discussing rights is to be
made, it must be rooted in the Trinity-rooted within a theological
and Christological understanding of human beings, church, politics,
and law. One useful place to begin (although certainly not the only
place) is by considering an exemplar of this sort of grand vision: St.
Thomas Aquinas. Far too often, the massive synthesis of Thomistic
thought is reduced to the few questions in the Summa Theologica
devoted to the law, without giving proper attention to the theological
context of the thought of the Angelic Doctor.4" The Treatise on Lawis
richly theological and eminently Christological. Human law, for St.
Thomas, is rooted in the eternal law, which is expressed by God the
Father in the Son, and through the Holy Spirit conveyed to the
disciples.49  Properly understood, the Treatise on Law is fully
Trinitarian because it begins with the Eternal Law and ends with the
new law of Christ.5 ° Within this context, St. Thomas finds room for a
natural and human law. l He argues that because there is a natural
law that is written on the human heart, it is possible for a limited
version of moral goods to be realized in societies.52 This version is
limited because, while they are truly moral goods,53 they are not fully
46. Id.
47. See AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, Book XIX (Henry Bettenson trans., Penguin Books
1972). The leading commentary on St. Augustine's political thought is R. A. MARKUS,
SAECULUM: HISTORY AND SOCIETY IN THE THEOLOGY OF ST. AUGUSTINE (1970).
48. A useful article that makes this point is Frederick Christian Bauerschmidt, Aquinas, in
THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO POLITICAL THEOLOGY, supra note 6, at 48.
49. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Part I-Il, Question 91, Articles 1, 4; Question
106, Article 2 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1981) (1911).
50. Id Part I-II, Question 109, Articles 2, 5.
51. Id Part I-II, Question 91, Article 3.
52. Id. Part I-II, Question 91, Article 2.
53. Id. Part 1-I, Question 109, Articles 2, 5.
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actualized or fully understood. The good of the natural law peers
dimly through foggy analogy at the full light of the Eternal law.
There is thus a mystical dimension to the thought of St. Thomas,
even when he is writing on natural rights. He assures us that these
natural rights are good, 4 but not fully good, because the fullness of
the good (the summum bonum) is itself not knowable through reason
alone; reason was in the end subordinate to faith, mystical experience,
and the beatific vision.5 Even the metaphysical edifice that St.
Thomas created, the theory of Being and of He whose essence is to be,
is not the actualization of the highest good. It must be recalled that
for the Angelic Doctor, the highest truth and the highest good were
united in the beatific vision, knowledge of which is not expressible in
words. If the last days of St. Thomas's prolific life can be used as a
guide, silence is the proper response. It is the silence of St. Thomas
that embraces the mystical experience of the beatific vision, wherein
he could marvel, "all that I have written seems like straw to me."56
54. Id. Part I-II, Question 90, Article 1; Question 92, Article 1.
55. As Pope John Paul II has explained, "at the summit of its searching reason
acknowledges that it cannot do without what faith presents." Fides etRatio, supra note 28, 42.
Therefore, at that lofty summit, Christ brings the philosophical quest for meaning to an
unsurpassable fulfillment. Id. 34.
56. JAMES A. WEISHEIPL, O.P., FRIAR THOMAS D'AQUINO: HIS LIFE, THOUGHT, AND WORK
321 (1974). The traditional account of the end of St. Thomas's life given by Reginald of Pipemo,
Thomas's personal secretary, holds that he experienced an ecstatic awakening in which he
surpassed his previous metaphysical understanding. The story is told by Fr. James A.
Weisheipl, O.P. in the following passage:
On Wednesday morning, December 6, the feast of St. Nicholas, Thomas arose early as
usual to celebrate the Mass of the feast in the chapel of St. Nicholas. During Mass,
Thomas was suddenly struck (commotus) by something that profoundly affected and
changed him (mira mutatione). "After this Mass he never wrote or dictated
anything." In fact, he "hung up his instruments of writing" (an allusion to the Jews
who hung up their instruments during the exile) "in the third part of the Summa, in
the treatise on Penance." When Reginald realized that Thomas had altered entirely
his routine of more than fifteen years, he asked him, "Father, why have you put aside
such a great work which you began for the praise of God and the enlightenment of the
world?" To which Thomas answered simply, "Reginald, I cannot." But Reginald,
afraid that Thomas was mentally unbalanced from so much study, insisted that he
continue his writing and return to his former routine, at least at a slower pace. But the
more Reginald insisted, the more impatient Thomas became until he replied,
"Reginald, I cannot, because all that I have written seems like straw to me." Reginald
was mystified at this reply. But Thomas was serious; he could not go on. He was
physically and mentally unable to do so. The only recourse he had was to prayer for
himself, and acceptance of his inability to work.
Id. (quoting an account by Bartholomew of Capua).
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St. Thomas's silence should be read as a warning against
becoming overly committed to theories. Rights theories necessarily
deal with moral, philosophical, and religious conceptions. The moral
meaning of rights, the philosophical description of that meaning, and
the religious context in which the person is conceived as the bearer of
rights are unavoidable issues to anyone who would seek to
understand natural rights. It is essential for the rights theorist to
recognize when he or she is dealing with issues beyond the
competency of the discipline. As St. Thomas found that even his
massive systematization of metaphysics could turn to straw before
God, so too will disciplined approaches to issues as central to human
meaning as rights. It is not that the straw is not useful, and to engage
in the study of human rights is in itself transformative. The warning
that St. Thomas gives us at the end of his life is the warning against
reckless hubris-the reminder that the reality of God that makes
human rights meaningful and human lives purposeful transcends the
reach of reason.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, I suggest that theology's ability to plumb the depths
of human meaning allows it to boldly reassert the connection between
the moral life and the political life that was present in classical
thought, but appears to have been lost in contemporary attempts to
understand the political. This holds obvious implications for
understanding the nature of natural rights theories. The space
opened by theology allows for critical assessment of the way rights
theories strengthen and denigrate justice and the common good.
Development of a sensitivity to the Christian understanding of the
human person as created in the image of God stands as a hopeful
means of critiquing and reforming modern liberal theories that tend
toward over-emphasizing the subjective atomism of the individual
isolated person. As liberal democracies face the post-9/11 world, the
triumph of free-market liberalism over Marxism that seemed to
presage a new era of consumerist peace and materialist prosperity has
been blasted from its foundations by the reality of theological
meaning and purpose for ill and good. It is now well worth giving
pause to consider the project of political theology, which seeks to
secure human rights in a comprehensive account of politics and moral
understanding.
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